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ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY THE RECKLESS MOTORIST
Livingston Hall*
The tendency to use negligence or mobile" was developed by resourceful
recklessness in the criminal law as a courts as a means of securing a suitable
basis for conviction, in place of the re- penalty to be imposed upon the reckquirement in the early law of inten- less driver who has caused personal
tional wrongdoing, has been a charac- injury, not resulting in death, where
teristic of the law for centuries. Per- the penalties for the statutory offense
haps the most striking feature in this of reckless driving were inadequate.1
development in recent times has been If this were true, and if although legisthe efflorescence of the concept of reck- latures meant to impose a low penalty,
lessness as a basis of conviction for courts arbitrarily expanded another
assault and battery, without proof of crime to reach a different result, it
a clear-cut intent to inflict injury, would indeed be unfortunate judicial
2
where bodily injury less than death has legislation.
resulted from the defendant's act or
This proposition raises important
omission. The Age of Invention has questions in the development of the
come, developing devices of a deadli- criminal law, and seems to warrant a
ness formerly unknown and requiring careful re-examination of the auiomofor their safe handling a high degree bile assault cases, and an investigation
of care, and a considerable number of of the earlier cases dealing with recksuch convictions appear in the books lessness as a basis for liability for asand on the court records.
sault and battery.
The results of this investigation do
As in the field of torts, it is the automobile which now accounts for most not wholly bear out Professor Tulin's
of these recklessness cases. It was sug- thesis. It appears that the concept of a
gested by the late Professor Tulin a "reckless battery" was fully developed
dozen years ago that the concept of in the United States before the first
"assault by the reckless use of an auto- automobile cases were decided, and
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. For
assistance in preparing this article, the Wvriter is
indebted to Selig J. Seligman, a third year student at the Harvard Law School.
1 Tuin, The Role of Penaltiesin Criminal Law,
(1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048, hereafter cited as
"Tulin" It is not clear whether or not this theory
is adopted in the note in (1939) 16 N. Y. U. I. Q.
Rev. 290 at 294, on the influence of the doctrine
of criminal intent on criminal legislation affecting motor vehicles.
2 Judicial legislation through spurious inter-

pretation of statutes has been condemned in the

strongest terms. Landis, A Note on "Statutory
Interpretation," (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886.

Quite as improper is the unwarranted extension
of criminal liability through the development of
new common law crimes. See notes in (1933)
49 L. Q. Rev. 183 and (1934) 5 Camb. L. J.263,
criticizing the decision in Rex v. Manley, (1933)
1 K. B. 529, which created the offence of "public
mischief" tc convict a woman for falsely stating
to the police that she had been robbed, and causing them to waste time investigating the false
charge.
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that the latter bad their roots in decisions going back at least 50 years. The
law of battery developed during the latter half of the 19th century along common law principles, from intent to
recklessness, in the same manner as the
law of manslaughter (and in cases of
extreme recklessness, of murder) had
unfolded two centuries earlier. The
coming of the automobile, and the desire of prosecutors for heavier penalties
than many reckless driving statutes
permit, have done no more than provide numerous modem instances of this
development.

"depraved conduct" which is sufficient
for murder, differ from intent in that
the actor does not desire to accomplish
the harmful consequence in question,
nor does he know that it is substantially certain to result. Liability is
predicated upon the fact that he has
created an unreasonable risk that it
will result. The magnitude of the risk
required, to make it unreasonable, depends upon the social utility of the
act done, and upon whether a conviction is sought for battery or manslaughter, on the one hand, or for
murder.5

A working distinction between recklessness and intent must be made before we can proceed with the discussion. There is an extensive literature
on the subject, s but for our purposes we
may regard an actor as intending those
consequences of an act which (a) he
desires to accomplish, or (b) he knows
are substantially certain to be produced
by his act.' To say that a man is "presumed to intend the probable consequences of his acts" is to conceal, by
the use of an irrebuttable presumption
of law, the fact that he need not intend
the consequences in order to be liable.
Negligence, recklessness, and the

Whether or not it is also necessary
to prove that the defendant knew the
magnitude of the risk is a question
upon which the authorities are not
clear. In the absence of some serious
mistake of fact by the defendant, often
based upon intoxication or insanity, it
is usually immaterial which view as to
awareness is adopted. In cases where
awareness is not in issue, obviously the
degree of risk involved will, as it increases, run from negligence through
recklessness and the "depraved heart"
to intent, without any fixed boundary.
Nevertheless, the distinction has meaning, hard to phrase though it may be,

a One of the most complete treatments of the
subject is found in Cook, Act, Intention and Motive in the Criminal Law, (1917) 26 Yale L. J.
645 at 654-8.
4 This is the definition put forward in Perkins,
A Rationale of Mens Rea, (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev.
905 at 910-1. There is also authority that an actor further intends those consequences which he
knows are substantially certain to result from
his act if his act accomplishes the consequences
which he desires, although it may be far from
certain that the act will in fact result in these
consequences. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.
S. 616 (1919). Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent
did not maintain that such consequences were
not intended, but rather that the statute under
which Abrams was prosecuted should not be

read to extend to all intended consequences, but
only to consequences which the actor desired to
produce.
5In Pennsylvania, a greater degree of recklessness is required for battery than for manslaughter. Com. v. Bergen, 134 Pa. Super. 62, 4 A.
2d 164 (1939). Ordinarily there is no difference
between these two crimes in this respect. See
intra, note pp. 144, 153.
6This question is discussed in Wechsler and
Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide,
(1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 701, 1261 at 1274-76, and in
a note, (1939) 27 Ky. L J. 229. Com. v. Pierce, 138
Mass. 165 (I84) adopts an objective standard of
care, but a subjective standard still prevails in
England. Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1937] A. C. 576.
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and borderline cases are not as frequent as one might expect.
Relationship Between Manslaughter,
Assault, and Battery.
Recklessness as a ground of criminal
liability in personal injury crimes probably did not appear until the late 16th
or early 17th century. As has been
pointed out by Professor Sayre,7 there
may have been absolute liability for
criminal homicide before the 12th century. But such a harsh rule, if it ever
existed, was relatively short-lived.
About that time its place was taken by
a rule of the canon law brought into
the common law by Bracton-the rule
that an unintended killing in the course
of an unlawful act malum in se would
constitute manslaughter." Liability under this rule is not based upon recklessness, except where, as in some
modern cases, the phrase "a.um in
se" is interpreted in terms of dangerousness, and not, as was originally true,
in terms of morality. The illegal intent
accompanying the unlawful act from
which death occurred is regarded as
sufficient to justify a conviction. As the
law later developed, a murder conviction was possible if the unlawful act
were a felony, and liability for a battery may be imposed for an unintended injury resulting from an unlawTSayre, Mens Rea, (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974.
8 Bracton, De Legibus (1268) f. 120-121; see
Maitland, Bracton and Azo, Publications of the
Selden Society (VoL VIII, 1894) 232.
9 This doctrine was apparently first stated to be
applicable in battery cases as early as 1873, in
Com. v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323 (1873). It has been
extensively applied in automobile cases. In Ohio,
where battery is defined by Page Gen. Code
(I939) §12423 and earlier statutes as "unlawfully

striking or wounding another," liability without
intent to injure can be predicated only upon the
commission of an unlawful act. Fishwick v.

ful act, where there would have been
liability for manslaughter had death
ensued.'
The concept of recklessness as sufficient for criminal liability for manslaughter appears fully developed in
Hul's Case in 1664.10 Hull was indicted
for murder where he had thrown a
piece of timber from a height of two
stories, killing another workman. The
house stood 30 ft. from a highway or
common passage, and Hull had cried
"stand clear" before throwing the timber. Two of the three judges agreed
that this was only misadventure, but
they put the case of a similar act done
in the City of London with the house
touching the street, which, they said
would constitute manslaughter, due to
the number of people passing by, "because in common presumption his intention was to do mischief, when he
casts or shoots anything which might
kill among a multitude of people."
A few years earlier there had been
a somewhat similar decision in a murder case, Rex v. Halloway," where
Halloway had tied a boy to the tail
of a horse and had beaten the boy,
causing the horse to run away with
him. Upon these facts, the court held
that "it shall be said in law to be prepensed malice, he doing it to one who
made no resistance." In this case there
State, 14 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 368,33 Ohio Circ. Dec.

63 (1911); Keuhn v. State, 37 Ohio App. 217, 174
N. E. 606 (1930). In this respect battery follows
the Ohio manslaughter rule of Johnson v. State,
66 Ohio St. 59, 63 N. E. 607 (1902). No attempt has
been made in this article completely to cover
this type of criminal liability.
10 J.Kelyng 40, 84 Eng. Repr. 1072 (1664). There
is a full discussion of the history of this development in homicide cases in Davis, The Development of Negligence as a Basis for Liability in
Criminal Homicide Cases, (1938) 26 Ky. L, J. 209.
11 Cro. Car. 131, 79 Eng. Repr. 715 (1628).
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was certainly an intention to do some
injury to the boy, but it was the great
danger of death, although death was
pretty clearly not intended, which
caused the murder conviction. From
these cases stem the modern common
law rules that a killing due to gross
carelessness or recklessness is manslaughter; 12 while if the evidence
"shows an abandoned and malignant
heart on the part of the defendant," it,
is common law murder, although there
was no intention to kill or even to
cause injury." These common law
crimes based upon recklessness have
their statutory counterparts in many
states which have abandoned the common law definitions of manslaughter'
or murder. 15
In tracing the adoption, in cases
where death did not result, of these
homicide tests of recklessness or wanton conduct, we must make a clearcut distinction between assault and
battery. If there has been no actual

physical injury or offensive touching,
the crime is invariably referred to as
an "assault." It is usually held that
there can be no criminal liability unless there was an intent to inflict bodily
injury or an offensive touching, and
recklessness is never enough for liability.'" In some states, an intent to
cause apprehension in the victim is
enough for conviction, due to the influence of civil assault cases. 17 This
general rule has been followed in automobile cases, as in other cases, and no
cases have been found in which criminal liability was imposed for a reckless assault, which did not cause either
injury or offensive touching. 8 (With
the other possible additional requirements for a criminal assault, apprehension of the victim and present ability,
we are, of course, not here concerned.)
If there has been actual physical injury or an offensive touching, courts
often use the terms "assault" and "battery" interchangeably to apply to the

12 See Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide, (1936)
25 Calif. L. Rev. 1, and Robinson, Manslaughter
by Motorists, (1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 755.
IsMayes v. People, 106 IlM. 306 (1883). Less
strong language is used in phrasing the test in
Com. v. McLaughlin, 293 Pa. 218, 142 Atl. 213
(1928).
14 Manslaughter is usually defined to include a
killing by a gross or culpable negligence. In
Ohio, where it is limited to a "killing by an unlawful act," gross negligence is not enough.
Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 63 N. E. 607
(1902). Contra, Minardo v. State, 204 Ind. 422,
183 N. E. 548 (1932), under a similar statute.
Statutes are not uncommon which provide a
lesser penalty for a killing by a motor vehicle
through a failure to use ordinary care. See Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide, (1936) 25 Calif. L.
Rev. 1.
15 Usually a killing committed "by an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, without
a premediated design to effect death" constitutes
the lowest degree of murder. Minn. Stat. (1927)
§10070 (third degree) and Wis. State. (1937)
§340.03 (second degree) are typical. But by New

York Penal Law §1044, such a killing is murder
in the first degree, and it has been held that the
act must endanger a number of people. People
v. Ludkowitz, 266 N. Y. 233, 194 N. E. 688 (1935).
16 United States v. Hand, 2 Wash. C. C. 435
(1810) is an early case which has never been
questioned. See Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048
at 1053.
17 Thne cases are collected in a note, The Misuse of the Tort Definition of Assault in a Criminal Action, (1939) 11 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 104. The
note, however, fails to distinguish between common law assault cases and cases decided under
various statutory provisions, and its conclusions
as to the weight of authority at the common law
are open to question on this ground. See also,
State v. Desco, ... Vt... , 1 A. (2d) 710 (1938).
Under statutes defining an assault as "an attempt
to commit a battery" it should not be possible
to convict where the defendant merely intended
to alarm the victim. McKay v. State, 44 Tex. 43
(1875).
is Of course, if there is an actual intention to
cause injury or apprehension thereof, an assault
without injury may be committed as well by an
automobile as in any other way. Cf. Bryson v.
State, 20 S. W. (2d) 1047 (Tex. Cr. App. 1929).
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crime,' 9 and the same is true in many
statutes, since the punishment is usually the same.2 0 Speaking accurately,
such a crime is a "battery."
The considerations which should govern criminal liability for assault and for
battery are entirely different. An assault is in the nature of an attempt to
inflict a battery, and for all such incomplete crimes the specific intention to
commit the crime which has been attempted is of the essence of the attempt. Until the coming of the automobile it was not necessary to punish
those who merely created a risk of injury, and there has never been a common law crime of "negligence in the
air." The development of criminal liability for "reckless driving" without
injury, following the coming of the
automobile, has been exclusively statutory.
The manslaughter analogy has no
possible application to support the development of a common law assault or
other crime based on recklessness,
where there has been no injury. In
the involuntary manslaughter cases, the
serious consequence of death resulting
from an act which is reckless or illegal,
19 In a few cases a distiction has been taken

between these cimes, een where physical in-

jury was proved. See infra,p. 149.
20 Thus New York Penal Law §244 provides:
"A person who commits an assault or an assault
and battery * * * is guilty of assault in the
third degree." Vernon's Texas Penal Code (1936)
art. 1144 provides: "The word 'battery' is used
in this Code in the same sense as 'assault and
battery'." But in California, where the punishment for assault differs from that for battery, it
becomes necessary to keep the terms separate,
and a conviction of assault requires proof or
presumption of intent, even though there has
been a clear battery. People v. Vasquez, 85 Cal.
App. 575, 259 Pac. 1005 (1927). See infra, p. 149.
21 Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the
Law of Homicide (1937) 37 CoL L. Rev. 701, 1261
at 1294-98.

but not intended to produce death, justifies a serious penalty upon retributive
grounds. It has been said that this is
also true under a deterrent theory of
punishment. 21 Obviously this same an-

alogy applies to liability for battery
based upon the happening of physical
injury short of death due to recklessness or an unlawful act. Many cases
have noted this fact, or cited manslaughter cases in support of a conviction for such a battery 2 2 But the
principle that the harmful result of such
conduct may justify a punishment not
warranted by the conduct without any
harmful result, does not warrant the
imposition of punishment for an assault
if no physical harm at all has been
caused by the conduct of the defendant, and he did not intend to inflict
injury.
Nevertheless, it is by analogy to cases
holding that there can be no assault
without physical injury, unless there
was an intention to inflict harm or at
least to cause apprehension, and upon
one New Jersey case holding that recklessness with an automobile did constitute an assault and battery,2" that Professor Tulin based his major premise:
22 Some of the more striking cases are Com. v.
Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32 N. E. 862 (1893); Tyner
v. United States, 2 Okla. Cr. 689, 103 Pac. 1057
(1909); Winkler v. State, 45 Okla. Cr. 32A 283
Pac. 591 (1929); Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98
N. E. 640 (1912); State v. Sudderth, 184 N. C. 753,
114 S. E. 828 (1922); Brinhall v. State, 31 Ariz.
522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927); State v. Agnew, 202 N. C.
755, 164 S. E. 578 (1932). There are a very few
cases which deny the analogy. State v. Thomas,
65 N. J. L. 598, 48 AUt. 1007 (1900) contains a statement to this effect which was not overruled in
State v. Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 Atl. 112 (1915).
See also, Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468, 144
So. 895 (1932).
23 State v. Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 At. 11Z
aff'd 88 N. J. L. 396, 96 Atl. 659 (1916). See infra,
p. 147.
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Before the automobile battery cases
were decided, there could be "no such
24
thing as a 'negligent' battery."
Even if one were to limit his consideration of the subject to the English
law, this statement would go beyond
any decided English case. In the early
case of Rex v. Gill,2 5 a man was indicted "for throwing down skins into
a man's yard, which was a public way,
per quod another man's eye was beat
out." The evidence showed that the
wind had taken the skin and blown it
away, and the defendant was acquitted.
From the cases cited by the court, it
appears clear that there was no negligence here at all.
In the later English case of Reg. v.
Martin,26 there is a statement that
recklessness was enough for a conviction under 24 and 25 Vict. c. 100, §20,
punishing as a misdemeanant "Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously
wound or inflict any grievous bodily
harm on another person." The jury
found that the defendant, who had put
out the lights in a theatre at the close
of the performance and fixed an iron
bar across the doorway, as a result of
which many persons had been crushed
in the crowd, had done so "with the
intention of causing terror and alarm"
and "wilfully obstructing the means of
24 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1053. Cases
holding that there can be liability for a battery
where the defendant aims at one person and hits
another do not add anything one way or the

other, for it is well settled even in the few states
which require an intent to inflict injury, that the

intent need not be directed toward the person
actually hit, to constitute a common law battery.

People ex rel. Starvis v. Rogers, 170 Misc. 609, 10
N. Y. S. 2d 722 (City Ct. New Rochelle 1939).
But an aggravated assault statute or indictment
may require the intention to be directed against

the person actually wounded. Rex v. Holt, 7
Car. & P. 518 (1836); People v. Stoyan, 280 Ill.

exit." Lord Coleridge dealt with the
case as on the same footing with the
"malice" needed for murder, and
Stephen, J., thought that "if the prisoner did these acts recklessly he did
them wilfully," and the conviction was
affirmed. The counts for assault had
been withdrawn from the jury, but
Stephen, J., "had very great doubt
whether they were not maintainable."
However this may be, it is commonly
stated by modern writers upon the
English law that there can be no common law criminal battery without
"actual intention" to commit injury, 27

although no other criminal cases are
cited upon the question.
The crime of battery in the United
States has developed much farther,
drawing from the manslaughter analogy. The earliest extension was apparently by a statute in Missouri enacted
28
in 1845 which made it a felony:
'If any person shall be maimed,
wounded or disfigured, or receive great
bodily harm, or his life be endangered,
by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, in cases and under
circumstances which would constitute
murder or manslaughter if death had
ensued."
There do not seem to have been any
American common law prosecutions for
reckless battery, or cases even discuss300, 117 N. E. 464 (1917). See note, (1938) 42 Dick.
L. Rev. 86.
25 1 Strange 190, 93 Eng. Repr. 466 (1719).
14 Cox C. C. 633 (1881).
27 Russell, Crimes, (9th Eng. ed., 1936) 567-77;
26

Kenney, Outlines of Criminal Law, (14th Eng.
ed., 1933) 160-61.
28 Act of March 27, 1845, art. 2, §38, now Mo.
Stat. (1932) §4016, carrying imprisonment up to 5
years. This statute was applied in State v.
Groves, 194 Mo. 452, 92 S. W. 631 (1906), to a case
of reckless shooting, and it has since been applied
to reckless motorists; see infra, note 119.
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ing the question, until 1855. In the next
decade three cases were decided which
forecast the various lines of development of the next half century. 29 It was
apparently not until the pistol became
a widely-owned weapon that prosecutors had made any attempt to extend
the concept of battery to the manslaughter limits.30 Prior studies have
touched only lightly s upon the reckless battery cases decided prior to the
first automobile battery case of this
type in 1912,31 but it seems necessary to
investigate these authorities with some
care if the factors which produced the
automobile battery cases are to be dis-

covered and evaluated.

to charge the jury that he could not be
guilty unless he had acted "malo
animo." The conviction was affirmed,
the Massachusetts court holding the refusal of his requested charge to be
correct, and saying: 3 '
'It is undoubtedly true that, in order
to support an indictment for assault and
battery, it is necessary to show that it
was committed ex intentione,and that if
the criminal intent is wanting, the offence is not made out. But this intent
is always inferred from the unlawful act.
The unreasonable and excessive use of
force on the person of another being
proved, the wrongful intent is a necessary and legitimate conclusion in all
cases where the act was designedly committed. It then becomes an assault
and battery, because purposely inflicted
without justification or excuse."

Pre-Automobile Cases on
Reckless Battery

At first reading, the language seems
to bear upon our problem, for an act
(a) Supporting a Requirement of ex intentione is expressly required. But
all that the court held was that if there
Intent to Injure.
The first case found which in any was an intentional infliction of injury,
way appears to advance this doctrine it was not necessary that the defendis Commonwealth v. Randall,s a Massachusetts case decided in 1855. Here
the defendant, a school teacher, had
been convicted of assault and battery
where he had, as the jury found, inflicted "improper and excessive punishment" upon one of his scholars. Of
course, he had intended to inflict bodily
injury or harm, but he asked the judge
29 Com. v. Randall, 4 Gray (Mass.) 36 (1855),
infra, this page; State v. Sloanaker, 1 Houst.
(Del.) 62 (1858), infra, p. 142; State v. Myers,
19 Ia. 517 (1865), infra, p. 143.
so It will be noted that most of the. cases cited

in this article which imposed liability for a reckless battery prior to 1900 involved the use of
pistols, which are of course much more likely to
be carelessly handled and to cause injury than
rifles. In 1812 the first statute against carrying
a concealed weapon was passed, and by 1855
such statutes were in force in seven states. But
they did not become common until after 1911.

ant realize also that as a matter of

law he was inflicting excessive force in
order to have the requisite criminal

intent for conviction. In other words,
a mistake of law of this type is no
defense to this crime. Bishop in 1865
cited the case in a footnote to a
guarded statement that for criminal
liability "it seems not to be always
See Warner, The Uniform Pistol Act, (1938) 29
Jour. Crim. L. 529.
s1 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1060-62,
discusses only the cases cited in State v. Schutte,
87 N. J. L. 15, 93 AUt. 112 (1915).
32 This was Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98
N. E. 640 (1912). There is one earlier automobile
battery case, which was not based upon recklessness but upon the commission of an unlawful
act resulting in injury. Fishwick v. State, 14
Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 368,33 Ohio C. D. 63 (1911).
38 4 Gray (Mass.) 36 (1855).
8 44 Gray (Mass.) 38-9.
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necessary that there should be a specific intent to commit an assault, or a
battery, or any other crime which in law
includes an assault."" Nor was the case
cited at all when in 1893 the Massachusetts court squarely held that a battery could be predicated upon "gross
carelessness and negligence, or wan36
ton and reckless conduct.
Precisely similar to the Randall case
in facts, language, and ground of decision, is the Indiana case of Vanvactor
v. State.3 7 The statement is again made
that "To support a charge of an assault and battery it is necessary to

show that the act complained of was
intentionally committed."

(Italics in

original.) The court goes on to say that
proof of excessive force will supply the
needed intent. As the evidence did not
prove that excessive force was used,
the conviction was reversed. And as
happened to the Randall case, this
Indiana dictum about intent was in
substance overruled in 1889, to the extent that it might require an intent to
inflict injury which could not be implied from recklessness, by a later
Indiana case, Mercer v. Corbin,3" in
which the Vanvactor case was not even
cited.
More to the point are later New
York cases. Although only dicta, they
seem to have established a New York
rule that there must be an intent to
injure to constitute an "assault and
battery" as defined by the New York
31 2 Bishop, Criminal Law (3rd ed., 1865) §76.

3GCom. v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32 N. E. 862
(1893).
37113 Ind. 276, 15 N. E. 341 (1887).
38 117 Ind. 450, 20 N. E. 132 (1889).
39 4 N. Y. Cr. 193 (5th Dept. 1885).
40 4 N. Y. Cr. 197.

statutes in common law terms. In
People v. Sullivan," the defendant had
choked a woman with his hands and
drew a butcher knife "as if to cut her
throat but did not injure her otherwise
than to choke her some." He was convicted of assault in the second degree
under New York Penal Code §218 punishing one who "wilfully and wrongfully assaults another by the use of a
weapon or other instrument or thing
likely to produce grievous bodily
harm." The trial judge had charged
the jury that the defendant was guilty
if he made an assault with the butcher
knife, although he did not intend to do
bodily harm with the knife. The conviction was reversed, the court saying:
"To constitute a criminal assault an
intent to do bodily harm, or by violence
to insult, is requisite." 0 It will be
noted, however, that there was here no
battery with the deadly weapon, and
the choking warranted a conviction
only of simple assault and battery.
Similar statements are contained in
other cases involving assault without
injury,41 and in a case involving a battery through rude conduct, in which it
was held that taking a girl's arm in a
friendly way, without an intent to insult
her or to be rude, did not constitute
a criminal battery." However weak as
authority these decisions may be as to
the possibility of a reckless battery,
the New York legislature in 1921
evidently felt it necessary to broaden
41 People v. Ryan, 55 Hun 214, 7 N. Y. Cr. 448
(1st Dept. 1889); People v. Terrell, 58 Hun 602, 11
N. Y. S. 364 (5th Dept. 1890); cf. Hays v. People,
1 Hill 351 (1841).
42 People v. Hale, 1 N. Y. Cr. 533 (3rd Dept.
1883); cf. Clayton v. Keeler, 18 Misc. 488, 42 N.

Y. S. 1051 (1896).
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the definition of simple assault and
battery in New York Penal Law §244
to include the infliction of bodily injury by the operation of a vehicle in
4 8
a culpably negligent manner.
The last state to hold that there may
not be a common law conviction for
assault and battery based on negligence
appears to be New Jersey. In State v.
Thomas,44 defendant was indicted for
manslaughter but convicted of assault
and battery. The Court of Errors and
Appeals reversed the conviction, on the
ground that a manslaughter indictment
did not necessarily charge an assault
and battery, since manslaughter could
be committed without an assault and
battery. After discussing State v.
4
" in which a switch tender had
O'Brien,
been convicted of manslaughter where
he negligently failed to perform his
duty, the court in the Thomas case
said: 48
"Certainly if death had not ensued
from his negligence, but only personal
injury, a charge of criminal assault and
battery could not have been sustained."
There is no evidence that the court
had investigated the law on the subject, and no cases were cited in support
of this statement. It is significant that
in the next New Jersey case involving
a reckless battery, a number of decisions from other states holding that
there could be such a crime were called
to the court's attention, and the de43 Laws 1921, ch. 238, amending Penal Law §244.
There is a recent dictum that "intent is necessary
to constitute an assault" in other cases, in People
ex rel. Starvis v. Rogers, 170 Misc. 609, 610, 10 N.
Y .S. 2d 722 (City Ct. New Rochelle 1939).

44 65 N. . L. 598, 48 Alt. 1007 (1900).
45 3 Vroom 169 (1867).
48 65

N. J. L. 600.

cision in the Thomas case was in effect
overruled, although the court was unwilling to appear to do so, and used
47
the language of presumed intent.
The express provisions of the Texas
statutes prevented the development of
a reckless battery in that state. Vernon's Texas Penal Code (1936) art.
1138 has provided for more than 50
years:
"The use of any unlawful violence
upon the person of another, with intent
to injure him, whatever be the means or
the degree of violence used, is an assault
and battery." (Italics supplied.)
Of course the Texas Court of Appeals,
in the first case to come before it on
this question, 48 was forced to say: "To
constitute an assault and battery there
must be an intent to injure." (Italics
in original.) The Texas law has always
followed this case, and although the
statute further provides that if bodily
injury is inflicted, the burden is then
placed upon the defendant to prove
that there was no intent to inflict injury, 49 yet if the evidence, even in an
automobile case, shows that the injury
was caused by negligence and without
intent to injure, the conviction must be
reversed. 0 By Texas Acts of 1917, c.
207, the legislature broadened the definition of battery to coincide with the
common law definition by making any
driver of a motor vehicle or motorcycle who "shall wilfully or with gross
47 State v. Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 Atl. 112
(1915), aff'd 88 N. J. L. 396, 96 Atl. 659 (1916).
48 Rutherford v. State, 13 Tex. App. 92 (1882).
49 Vernon's Texas Penal Code (1936) art. 1139.
50 Coffey v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. Rep. 481, 200 S.
W. 384 (1918), involving an aggravated battery
under Branch's Penal Code (1916) §1022, providing "An assault or battery becomes aggravated
when cominitted * * * when a serious bodily
injury is inflicted upon the person assaulted.
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negligence collide with or cause injury
to any other person" guilty of aggravated assault. As this section now
reads, 5 no more than ordinary negli52
gence appears to be required.

if the pistol was discharged "unintentionally and by accident merely, however imprudent, or improper, it may
have been," but that if the jury "were
satisfied by the proof that he discharged
We see, therefore, that the doctrine it intentionally and wantonly or reckthat an intent to inflict injury was lessly into the crowd of persons asnecessary at the common law for a con- sembled about the place at the time,
viction of assault and battery in 1912, or in the direction of the carriage of the
when the- first automobile case of reck- prosecuting witness, indifferent as to
less battery was decided, rested on two whom he might shoot, or what the misdicta, both of which had already been chief or injury might be, or where or
overruled, and upon the New York and on whom it might fall, such conduct
New Jersey cases, with a Texas sta- would manifest a wicked and depraved
tute to provide a moral support. But inclination and disposition on his part,
even in 1912 the weight of authority that it might well be presumed by them
was clearly against this view, as the that he intended at the time to shoot
some one, upon the principle that every
next two sections show.
one is presumed to intend the natural
(b) Imputing an Intent to Injure from and probable consequence of his own
Recklessness
act," and that he might be convicted
We start and end our discussion of of simple assault and battery upon such
pre-automobile cases of this type with evidence. As to the assault with intent
State v. Sloanaker.58 A Delaware nisi to kill Brown, the court charged that
prius case decided in 1858, it appears this intent could not be made out by
to be the first case recognizing that any such "inference or presumption.".
there might be such a thing as a reck- The defendant was acquitted by the
less battery. The evidence showed that jury, and drops out of the picture.
the defendant had fired a pistol while
However, this presumption of an inon the platform of a railway car, and tent to injure from the intentional dohad hit another passenger, one Brown. ing of a reckless act was to reappear
The defendant testified that the pistol in later automobile cases, chiefly in
had been accidentally discharged, but states which had earlier dicta requiring
the state claimed that he had recklessly an intent to inflict injury for battery.
discharged it into the crowd of people This device made it easy to bring the
on the train, and tried him for assault law of those states into line with the
and battery with intent to kill Brown. weight of authority, without purportThe trial court charged the jury that ing to overrule the earlier cases. The
defendant was not guilty of any crime language used here is identical with
51 Vernon's Texas Penal Code (1936) Arts.
1149 (as amended in 1939), 1230 et seq. See infra,
p. 152, for the present text of the statute.

52Young v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. Rep. 39, 47 S. W.
2d 320 (1932).
53 1 Houst. (Del.) 62 (1858).
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that used in Hul~s Case,5' the early
negligent manslaughter case, to perform the same function of making the
transition from intent to negligence.

The fore-runner to this important
group of cases is State v. Myers,5 decided in Iowa in 1865. The case itself
is not adequately reported, but it appears that the defendant was indicted
and convicted for "assault with intent
to inflict bodily injury" under Iowa
Code (1851) §2594. The conviction was
affirmed, the court approving an instruction summarized in the opinion as
follows: "Recklessly shooting into a
crowd, and wounding some one not intended, is criminal." One may suppose
that there was in fact an intent to injure someone, although not the person
actually wounded, but be that as it may,
the language above quoted was of considerable importance in the development of the law of battery. The case
was cited in 1874 by Wharton, for the
proposition, new to that text, that
"Recklessly shooting into a crowd is an
assault." 56 From here it passed into
general currency, and was cited for this
proposition in a number of later cases.
Four years later the Georgia court
held in Collier v. State 7 that one who
shot a pistol at another, "intending, at
the time, to shoot at him, not caring
whether he hit him or not," was guilty

of an assault with intent to murder
where the pistol ball hit the victim in
the thigh, even though, as the court admitted, the defendant may not affirmatively have intended to kill or even to
wound. A number of years later, in
1893, the same court stated that "there
are wanton or reckless states of mind
which are sometimes the equivalent of
a specific intention to kill" in Gallery v.
State, 8 and although the earlier case
was not cited, its influence must have
been felt to some extent.
The Georgia court later reversed a
conviction for the statutory offence of
"shooting at another with a gun" under Georgia Penal Code §115 in Wolfe
v. State, 9 but there is a clear intimation in the case that "criminal negligence will supply the place of intent"
for that crime, which is of course closely analogous to a common law battery.
There is also the early Pennsylvania
case of Smith v. Commonwealth," in
which a conviction for assault and battery and for the aggravated assault of
"unlawfully and maliciously inflicting
upon another person, either with or
without any weapon or instrument, any
grievous bodily harm" was affirmed, in
the face of a finding of the jury by special verdict that the defendant had discharged his pistol and wounded someone in a train "with the intent to shoot
into the floor, and not with the intent
to injure the prosecutor or any other
person." The Supreme Court held that

54 J. Kelyng 40, 84 Eng. Repr. 1072 (1664). See
supra, p. 135.

58 92 Ga. 463, 17 S. E. 863 (1893). See the discussion of the later Georgia aggravated assault

(c) Basing a Battery Conviction on
Recklessness.

5 19 Iowa 517 (1865).

a6 2 Wharton, CriminalLaw (7th Ed., 1874) 213.
57 Collier v. State, 39 Ga. 31 (1869). This astonishing decision was finally overruled in Wright
v. State, 168 Ga. 690, 148 S. E. 731 (1929).

cases, infra, p. 15.
5 121 Ga. 587, 49 S. E. 688 (1905).
60100 Pa. 324 (1882), aff'd sub nom. Com. v.

Lister, 15 Phila. 405 (1882).
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the act was "recklessly and wilfully
done" and that from this "the law will
imply malice." Reg. v. Martin6 1 was the
only case cited by the court on the
point, and the court declined to apply
the cases cited by the defendant holding that an intent to injure was necessary for an assault without injury.
The essential similarity between battery and manslaughter was the basis of
the famous Massachusetts decision in
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 62 in which
a conviction for assault and battery
with a dangerous weapon was affirmed
where the defendant had fired a pistol
"in a grossly careless and negligent
manner, or in a wanton and careless
manner, and by so doing wounded
63
Mary A. Powers." The court said:
"In the case at bar, if Mary A. Powers
had died from the pistol shot, the defendant, on the facts found by the jury,
would have been guilty of manslaughter.
As she survived the injury, the same
principle now requires a conviction of
assault and battery. There has been
much discussion in the cases in regard
to the nature of the intent necessary to
constitute this crime, but the better
opinion is that nothing more is required
than an intentional doing of an act
which, by reason of its wanton or
grossly negligent character, exposes another to personal injury, and causes
such an injury."
The reckless and wilful discharge of
a revolver at the ground while chasing
a boy, without intent to do bodily injury, was held sufficient in State v.
Surry, 64 a Washington case, to sustain
a conviction for simple assault and battery where the bullet glanced from the
14 Cox C. C. 633 (1881), supra, p. 138.
157 Mass. 551, 32 N. E. 862 (1893).
63157 Mass. 553.
64 23 Wash. 655, 63 Pac. 557 (1900).
61
62

65

19 Iowa 517 (1865), supra, p. 143.

sidewalk and hit the fugitive. But the
court approved an acquittal of the aggravated crime of "assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to do bodily
injury." The court cited and relied on
State v. Myers 5 as far as simple assault
and battery was concerned.
The doctrine that gross carelessness
"implying an indifference to consequences" in handling a gun is enough
for battery was expressly adopted by
the Supreme Court of Alabama in
Medley v. State,6 even though the defendant had not intentionally discharged his rifle "at a place where it
was likely some person would be hit."
The Court of Appeals in the later case
of McGee v. State,67 interpreting the
earlier decision in the light of the record which was available to it, said that
what was required was "that the defendant designedly did an act calculated to produce bodily harm to another," and was unwilling to apply it
to a case where the defendant's shotgun had been accidentally discharged,
but even this constituted a recognition
that no intent to injure was needed for
a battery. The Court of Appeals was
thus going back to the presumed intent
66

doctrine of the Sloanaker case.

The last of the decisions on this question before 1912 is Tyner v. United
States.6 The defendant was convicted
in the Indian Territory for assault
with intent to kill, where he had fired
his pistol "recklessly or heedlessly
* * or while running his horse at

*

156 Ala. 78, 47 So. 218 (1908).
4 Ala. App. 54, 58 So. 1008 (1912).
66 1 Houst. (Del.) 62 (1858), supra, p. 142.
69 2 Okla. Cr. 689, 103 Pac. 1057 (1909).
66
67
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an unusual rate of speed along the
street" (the latter was a statutory misdemeanor), striking a boy walking
nearby. The court affirmed the conviction upon the ground that if death had
resulted, the defendant would have
been guilty of manslaughter.70 The decision was undoubtedly correct as to
simple assault and battery, but is opposed to the weight of authority as far
as the proof of the intent to kill is concerned.7 1
It was against the background of all
these criminal cases that the first automobile battery case based upon recklessness was decided in Indiana in
1912.72 But the large number of decisions recognizing liability for recklessness long before the automobile
became a problem is not yet wholly
complete. For another source may also
be drawn upon-civil actions of trespass for assault and battery provided
an analogy which was not without its
effect upon the courts. Although there
may at one time have been absolute
civil liability for a trespass to the person, without intention or negligence, if
the injury was direct,78 yet as early as
1616 the defence of inevitable accident
was accepted, if "the defendant had
committed no negligence to give occasion to the hurt.""' The negligence required to establish liability was fixed
in some jurisdictions as "the want of

exercise of due care" as early as 1850.75
But in other states the same test for a
civil trespass as for a criminal prosecution was accepted where the declaration alleged an assault and battery, and
a recovery under such a declaration
was denied where negligence alone was
proved.
Typical of these latter jurisdictions
was Indiana, and the Supreme Court of
that state, as early as 1889 in Mercer v.
8
Corbin,7
held that a civil assault and
battery could be predicated upon injury arising out of "recklessness and
wanton disregard of human life and
safety" from which "malice and criminal intent" might be inferred, although
there was "no actual or specific intent"
to commit an assault and battery. Civil
and criminal cases were cited indiscriminately, the criminal cases including Commonwealth v. Lister" and
State v. Myers,8 and the manslaughter
case of Flinni v. State.79 A verdict for
plaintiff was affirmed upon the ground
that the defendant had ridden his bicycle down the footpath in violation of
a statute and in "wrongful and reckless
disregard of the rights of others."

70 The court also stated that the same facts
would make out an assault "with a deadly wea-

78 Anonymous, Y. B. Edw. IV, 7 P1. 18 (1466).

pon with intent to inflict on the person of another
a bodily injury" under Ind. Terr. Stat. (1899)
§909. See infra, p. 153.

71 See the Illinois cases discussed infra, p. 152.
Contra, Gallery V. State, 92 Ga. 463, 17 S. E. 863
(1893); State v. Taylor, 70 Vt. 1,39 Atl.447 (189).

72Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98 N. R. 640
(1912).

Reckless Battery by Automobile
We are at last in a position to judge
whether or not the Indiana court by
its decision in Lutherv. State"0 was creating a legal innovation in 1912 when
74 Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134 (1616).
75 Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 292 (1850).
78 U7 Ind. 450, 20 N. E. 132 (1889).

77 15 Phila. 405 (1882), supra, p. 134.
78 19 Iowa 517 (1865), supra, p. 143.
7 24 Ind. 286 (1865).
80 177 Ind. 619, 98 N. E. 640 (1912).
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it predicated liability for a criminal
battery on the reckless use of an automobile. Did it do so in order to make
possible the imposition of a maximum
penalty of $1,000 fine and 6 months in
the county jail for assault and battery,81
when the maximum for the first offense
of reckless driving was a fine of $50?82
Or was the court simply following out
the common law development which
had already taken place in Alabama,
Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Washington, and (in a civil case) in Indiana
itself, following the manslaughter analogy?
The question for decision was whether the evidence sustained a conviction
for assault and battery under Burns
Ind. Stat. (1908) §2242, providing
"Whoever, in a rude, insolent or angry
manner, unlawfully touches another, is
guilty of assault and battery." Defendant's automobile, while passing a street
car on the left hand side, had hit a bicyclist who was riding between him and
the street car and who had suddenly
turned out in front of him. The court
reversed the conviction upon the
ground that there was no evidence of
"a reckless disregard for the safety of
others indicating a willingness to inflict
injury" from which the jury might
properly draw "the inference that appellant intended to injure" the bicyclist, but said in the course of its opinion: 83

"The evidence in this case establishes
the collision, and the hurt of Wiesehan
by the force of it, and is therefore a rude
81 Burns Ind. Stat. (1908) §2242.

82 Burns Ind. Stat. (1908) §10465, 10476.
83 177 Ind. 625-26.

touching of another. Inteni on the part
of the person charged, to apply the force
constituting the battery, is, however, an
essential element of the offense and
must be shown to make the touching
criminally unlawful. 2 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed.) §83; 5 Am. and Eng.
Ency. Law and Pr.680; Underhill, Crim.
Ev. (2d ed.) §354; Vanvactor v. State
(1888), 113 Ind.276, 280, 15 N. E. 341, 3
Am. St. 645; Perkins v. Stein & Co.
(1893), 94 Ky. 433, 22 S.W. 649, 20 L. R.
A. 861.
"But the intent may be inferred from
circumstances which legitimately permit
it. Intent to injure may not be implied
from a lack of ordinary care. It may be
from intentional acts, where the injury
was the direct result of them, done under circumstances showing a reckless
disregard for the safety of others, and a
willingness to inflict the injury or the
commission of an unlawful act which
leads directly and naturally to the injury. Underhill, Crim. Ev., supra; note
to Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St., 59, 63
N. E. 607; Banks v. Braman (1905), 188
Mass. 367, 74 N. E. 594; State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671, 74 Atl. 927; Mercer v.
Corbin (1889), 117 Ind. 450, 20 N. E.
132, 3 L. R. A. 221, 10 Am. St. 76; Reynolds v. Pierson (1902), 29 Ind. App.
273, 64 N. E. 484; Palmer v. Chicago,
etc. R. Co. (1887), 112 Ind. 250, 14 N.E.
70; Parker v. Pennsylvania Co. (1893),
134 Ind. 673, 34 N. E. 504, 23 L. R. A.
552; Fisher v. Louisville, etc. R. Co.
(1897), 146 Ind. 558, 45 N. E. 689."
The following of the manslaughter
analogy is clearly shown by the citation
of State v. Campbell,84 a case of automobile manslaughter through gross
negligence (although charged in the indictment both as an assault causing
death and as a killing by gross negligence). The court was also relying on
Mercer v. Corbin, 5 which, although a
civil case, had cited several of the ear84 82 Conn. 671, 74 AtI. 927 (1909).
85 117 Ind. 450, 20 N. E. 132 (1889), supra, p. 145.
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lier criminal reckless battery cases. It
is hard to see how any other decision
could have been more in accord with
the precedents, although, perhaps due
to the peculiar wording of the Indiana
battery statute requiring a "rude"
touching, it was necessary to couch the
decision in terms of implied intent to
injure, as was done in the Sioanaker
case/a and for that matter, in Hull's
Case. 87

Professor Tulin has criticized the
New Jersey court which decided the
1916 case of State v. Schutte8 for citing
earlier non-automobile cases holding
that there could be a reckless assault
and battery. The court decided that
intentionally driving a car "under circumstances that rendered likely the infliction of such an injury as that which
actually resulted from it" was equivalent to the "intention to inflict injury"
which is of the essence of criminal assault. Professor Tulin says: "It is thus
seen that not a single one of the authorities cited has any resemblance to the
problem of determining whether the
penalty fixed by the legislature for
reckless driving should be increased by
holding the defendant guilty of assault
and battery."''
But it is submitted that neither the
New Jersey court in this case, nor the
Indiana court in the Luther case, was
determining, or should have determined, any such problem. The proper
pejalty for a criminal, act is a matter
for the legislature under modern penal
codes. The only question properly before either court was whether or not
so1 Houzt. (Del.) 62 (1858), supra, p. 142.

87J. Kelyng 40, 84 Eng. Repr. 1072 (1664),
supr, p. 135.

the defendant's acts constituted a battery. The circumlocution and the talk
of "imputed intent" was due to the
court's natural (but not necessarily
laudable) desire to avoid the appearance of overruling earlier dicta in each
state. Both courts recognized that
American decisions in the previous half
century had broadened the concept of
battery, although indeed there appear
to have been no decisions prior to 1850
denying liability for recklessness.
Undoubtedly it is no mere coincidence that the automobile cases occur
in states in which the penalty for assault and battery is greater than that
for reckless driving. But this is not
because this factor has or should have
influenced the courts. A court can only
decide the cases which are argued before it. Obviously, in a state in which
the penalty for assault and battery is
no greater than for reckless driving,
there is no point in prosecuting a defendant for assault and battery, and no
prosecuting attorney will bring such a
case in one of these states. The only
inference to be drawn from Professor
Tulin's imposing table of statutory penalties for reckless driving and simple
assault and battery concerns the exercise of "The District Attorney's Option," and considerations of relative
penalties cannot be said to have moved
the courtsin any of these battery cases.
Attempts to state the type of reckless
conduct which is sufficient for a criminal battery, and the terms in which the
issue should be left to the jury, have
led to some confusion in automobile
88 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 AL. 112 (1915), af'd 88 N. J.
L. 396, 96 At. 659 (1916).
89 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1063.
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cases. On the whole, however, these

The most usual definition of the conduct and state of mind required for lia-

bility is this: "The defendant's acts
must be so (wanton) or (reckless) as
to show a (reckless) or (utter) disregard for the safety of others.""' It is
rarely safe for a trial court to leave the
question to the jury in less comprehensive terms. In a few states "recklessness" accompanied by gross negligence 92 or by an unlawful act" is all
that is required, but "recklessness or
carelessness" alone is not sufficient. 9'
It is well settled that negligence of a
character barely sufficient to support
civil liability is not enough in any
state,9" unless a statute specifically provides otherwise.9 6
The fact that the battery results from
an unlawful act is also of importance.
If the unlawful act is malum in se,97 or

90 Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165
(1927); Com. v. Kalb, 129 Pa. Super, 241, 195 Atl.
428 (1938); Radley v. State, 197 Ind. 200, 150 N. E.
97 (1926); Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468, 144
So. 895 (1932); People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124,
169 Pac. 152 (1917). In People v. Vasquez, 85 Cal.
App. 575, 259 Pac. 1005 (1927) the court holds the
defendant to have "intended the natural and
probable consequence of his unlawful and reckless act." In the early Indiana cases, a "willingness to injure" would be imputed from reckless
conduct. See quotation from Luther v. State,
supra, p. 146.
91 This definition, with some slight modifications in phraseology, is adopted in Brimhall v.
State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927); People v.
Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 169 Pac. 152 (1917); Maloney
v. State, 57 Ga. App. 265, 195 S. E. 209 (1938);
Radley v. State, 197 Ind. 200, 150 N. E. 97 (1926);
Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468, 144 So. 895
(1932); State v. Agnew, 202 N. C. 755, 164 S. E.
578 (1932); Com. v. Kalb, 129 Pa. Super. 241, 195
Atl. 428 (1938); Davis v. Com., 150 Va. 611, 143 S.E.
641 (1928). A similar result has been reached
under the Missouri and New York statutes requiring "culpable negligence." State v. Sawyers,
336 Mo. 644, 80 S.W. 2d 164 (1935) overruling State
v. Miller, 234 S.W. 813 (Mo. Sup. 1921); People v.
Waxman, 232 App. Div. 90, 249 N. Y. S. 180 (1st
Dept. 1931).
92 State v. Hamburg, 4 W. W. Har. (34 Del.) 62,
143 Atl. 47 (1928), a nisi prius case; Com. v.
Temple, 239 Ky. 188, 39 S. W. 2d 228 (1931).
93 Pierce v. Com., 214 Ky. 454, 283 S. W. 418
(1926); cf. State v. Richardson, 179 Iowa 770, 162
N. W. 28 (1917).
94 State v. Lancaster, 208 N. C. 349, 180 S. E.
577 (1935). Under the earlier Pennsylvania

decisions, "wantonness or recklessness" was
enough. Com. v. Gayton, 69 Pa. Super. 513 (1918).
Now a "reckless disregard of safety" must be
proved. Com. v. Kalb, 129 Pa. Super. 241, 195 Atl.
428 (1938). Of course, in any jurisdiction, if the
defendant is not even guilty of "reckless driving," he should not be convicted of assault and
battery. State v. Rawlings, 191 N. C. 265, 131 S.
E. 632 (1929).
95 Ordinarily the language used by the trial
court is vastly different from that applicable to
the torts cases. If the trial judge has used torts
language in his charge, or if the evidence does
not sustain a finding of more than ordinary negligence, the conviction should be reversed. People v. Anderson, 310 Ill. 389, 141 N. E. 727 (1923);
Radley v. State, 197 Ind. 200, 150 N. E. 97 (1926);
Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468, 144 So. 895
(1932); State v. Albertalli, 112 Atl. 724 (N. J.,
1915); State v. Lancaster, 208 N. C. 349, 180 S. E.
577 (1935). There is a statement by a dissenting
judge in State v. Sussewell, 149 S. C. 128, 146 S. E.
697 (1929) to the effect that simple negligence
would be enough for a conviction of assault and
battery, but the majority does not discuss the
point, as the case involved an aggravated assault.
98 The Texas statute originally required "gross
negligence" but no more than ordinary negligence appears to be now required. See supra,
p. 142.
97 King v. State, 157 Tenn. 635, 11 S. W. 2d 904
(1928). In the states which make this distinction,
an unlawful act merely malum prohibitum is of
course not qnough. State v. Rawlings, 191 N. C.
265, 131 S. E. 632 (1929). The nature of this distinction is far from clear, and it has come in for
a great deal of criticism. See note, (1930) 30 Col.
L. Rev. 74. But so long as it is administered in

cases hang together more consistently

than do the cases of recklessness in
other fields, for there are not many different types of reckless conduct possible in connection with the use of automobiles.
There is no substantial difference in
the conduct required for liability in
states which use the language of "imputed intent," and in other states which
avoid this fiction. The intent is "imputed by law" from reckless conduct
and the jury is not required to infer the
existence of an actual intent to do in°
jury.
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a proximate cause of the battery,9 or
accompanied by negligence, 9 it has
been held in a few states to be a sufficient basis for liability, and in Ohio
any unlawful act resulting in injury is
enough. 100 In any event, the commission of an unlawful act is usually regarded as some evidence of negligence,
to be considered with all the other circumstances by the jury in determining
whether or not the requisite degree of
recklessness is found. 10 1

or if a "reasonably careful person doing
the same act would have been guilty of
a conscious disregard of life."' 0' It
seems clear that intoxication does not
excuse but rather aggravates the type
of recklessness required for liability."' 0 5

Whether or not the defendant was
actually aware of the risk which his
reckless conduct was creating is rarely
an issue in these cases. Most sober men
will not drive in a reckless manner
without being conscious of the risk they
are creating. 10 2 What few intimations
there are seem to say that it is not
necessary for the defendant to have
known of the dangerous tendency of
his acts, if he "ought to have known"'10

One troublesome procedural problem
remains. If the defendant has been indicted for some kind of aggravated assault, and the indictment does not include.an express charge of battery, the
jury may bring in a verdict of "guilty
of simple assault." A few courts hold
that the aggravated assault charge does
not include a battery and that the verdict must be supported as a verdict for
an assault or not at all. ° 6 Under these
circumstances, a conviction for assault
has been affirmed where the undisputed evidence showed that physical
injury had, resulted, and the intent required for the assault has been imputed
from recklessness, as in the case of a

terms of dangerousness of the act, which seems
to be the modem tendency, it may serve a useful
purpose.
98 State v. Agnew, 202 N. C. 755, 164 S. E. 578
(1932).
O9People v. Saroff, 227 App. Div. 114, 237 N. Y.
S. 73 (2d Dept. 1929), under a statute requiring
"culpable negligence." In some states there
must also be proof of recklessness, and the commission of the unlawful act does not seem to add
much to the case. Brinhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522,
255 Pac. 165 (1927); Davis v. Com., 150 Va. 611,
143 S. E. 641 (1928).
100 Keuhn v. State, 37 Ohio App. 217, 174 N. E.
606 (1930); Fishwick v. State, 14 Ohio C. C. (N.
S.) 368, 33 Ohio C. D. 63 (1911).
101 Singer v. State, 194 Ind. 397, 142 N. E. 864
(1924); State v. Schutte, 88 N. J. L. 396, 96 AtI.
659 (1916); Com. v. Gayton, 69 Pa. Super. 513
(1918).
102 In Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468, 144 So.
895 (1932) the defendant had carelessly started
his automobile and ran into a woman standing
just in front of him. He claimed that he did not
see her standing there and the trial court charged
the jury that he was guilty if he could have seen
her "by reasonable diligence." The conviction
was affirmed, but the upper court did not pass on
the correctness of this instruction, since the evidence clearly indicated that he had in fact seen

her. In Tift v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S. E. 41
(1916), the defendant was convicted where he
had suffered an attack of vertigo while driving
his automobile, but the jury found, under the
court's charge, that he knew he was subject to
frequent attacks of this character.
. 03 Radley v. State, 197 Ind. 200, 150 N. E. 97
(1926).
101 State v. Sawyers, 336 Mo. 644, 80 S.W. 2d 164
(1935), under a statute requiring "culpable negligence."
105 Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165
(1927); Mundy v. State, 59 Ga. App. 509, 1 S. E.
2d 605 (1939); Chambliss v. State, 37 Ga. App.
124, 139 S. E. 80 (1927); Com. v. Gayton, 69 Pa.
Super. 513 (1918); Davis v. Coin. 150 Va. 611, 143
S. E. 641 (1928). If driving while intoxicated is
regarded as a crime nalum in se, a conviction
may be warranted on this, without proof of recklessness. King v. State, 157 Tenn.635, 11 S. W. 2d
904 (1928). Prior to the automobile cases it had
also been held that intoxication was no defense
to simple assault and battery. Whitten v. State,
115 Ala. 72, 22 So. 483 (1896).
1(0 People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 169 Pac. 152
(1917); People v. Vasquez, 85 Cal. App. 575, 259
Pac. 1005 (1927) (by implication). Contra: State
v. Sudderth, 184 N. C. 753, 114 S. E. 828 (1922);
Maloney v. State, 57 Ga. App. 265, 195 S. E. 209
(1938) (by implication).
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battery. 01' The same result has been
reached where the defendant was indicted for "assault and battery" and the
jury has convicted him of "simple assault" only, although the undisputed
evidence showed the commission of a
battery. 0 8 These decisions represent an
extreme instance of the policy of the
law of upholding convictions for a lesser crime than that proved by the evidence where the defendant has, through
the technicalities of pleading or by a
compromise verdict, been let off more
lightly than he deserved."0 9
Aggravated Assault by Automobile
As their name implies, the aggravated assault cases usually arise under
statutes phrased in terms of "assault"
plus various accompanying circumstances which justify the increased
penalty." 0 Yet in every one of the automobile cases there has been actual
physical injury, amounting to an admitted battery. Should the court permit the battery to take the place of the
required assault, if there has been no
actual intent to injure or alarm, as is
required for an assault without physical injury? In two cases the court felt
that all the requirements of a technical
"assault" had to be met, but in one of
107 People v. Vasquez and People v. Hopper,
supra, n. 106.
108 Com. v. Bergdoll, 55 Pa. Super. 186 (1913).
109 See (1935) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 340. As an as-

sault is usually defined, both at common law
and under codes, as an "attempted battery," the
most that has been done is to permit indictment
and conviction for the attempt, where the evidence showed the commission of the completed
crime. This is expressly permitted in a number
of states by statute. Cal. Penal Code §663; Idaho
Code (1932) §17-305; Nev. Comp. L. (1929)
§9975 (2); N. Y. Penal Code §260; N. Dak. Comp.
L. (1913) §10337; Utah R. S. (1933) §103-1-29.
110 This is true even in the Texas statute ex-

them the intent was "imputed" from
recklessness, 1' and in the other, in
which recklessness did not clearly appear, the existence of an assault was
doubted. 112 In the remaining automobile cases in which a conviction for aggravated assault has been upheld, the
court has not discussed the matter.
There should be no question about liability, for the main considerations of
policy leading to a conviction for an aggravated "assault" apply even more
strongly where there has been an actual battery, although without the commission of a technical "assault."
Whether personal injury crimes be
punished primarily on the retributive
or the deterrent theory, there are at
least three possible aggravating factors in punishing an act causing injury
or death: (1) The amount of injury
actually caused; (2) the amount of injury risked; and (3) the amount of injury intended."

3

In the law of homi-

cide, which developed early at the common law, and which has been the subject of much legislation in America,
these factors are nicely taken care of.
The common law of England never developed a felonious assault or battery
(with the exception of mayhem, which
ceased to be a felony in early times) 14
pressly creating an aggravated "assault" based

upon the negligent driving of a motor vehicle

or a motorcycle which collides with or causes in-

jury to another. See infra, p. 152.
I Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165
(1927). See infra, p. 151.
112 People v. Smith, 217 Mich. 669, 187 N. W.
304 (1922).

1s See L. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 521 at

537-38; Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the
Law of Homicide, (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 701, 1261
at 1264-77.
114 Corn. v. Newell, 7 Mass. 245 (1810).
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and the common law penalty of unlimited imprisonment, at the discretion of
the court, for a misdemeanor, did not
require statutory intervention unless a
capital punishment or transportation
was desired as the penalty.
But in America, a relatively low
maximum punishment for misdemeanors, and particularly for simple assault
and batterS, was set by the legislature
in most states. Doubtless this was one
step in the deflation of the judge's
power which followed the Revolution.
Hence, aggravated assaults were created by the legislature with more serious punishments, and some or all of
these factors of aggravation were utilized as the basis of classification. To
what extent may they properly be applied to injuries caused by the reckless
driving of an automobile?

same recklessness which will support a
conviction for assault and battery if
slight harm is done, will support the
three year penalty under the statute if
"grievous bodily harm" has resulted.1 6
Although there is no Atatutory definition of an "assault of a high and aggravated nature" in South Carolina, the
infliction of serious bodily harm was
enough to justify a conviction before
the automobile came upon the scene"'
and in an automobile case such harm
recklessly inflicted is also sufficient." 8
A similar result is reached under the
Missouri statute on felonious wounding, requiring "culpable negligence"
from which the victim "be maimed,
wounded, or disfigured, or receive great
bodily harm or his life be endangered."1'19

(b) Aggravated Assault Based Upon
the Use of a Deadly or Dangerous
Weapon.
By similar reasoning, if there has
It is clear that such a crime requires
been
sufficient recklessness to constino intent to injure for conviction. For
instaince, the Arizona statute provides tute a battery, and the defendant has
a more serious penalty for an assault been reckless with a deadly or danger"when a serious injury is inflicted," ous weapon, causing actual injury, all
and a reckless disregard for the safety the elements of this type of aggravated
of others is enough, if such injury is assault are present. There was at least
caused thereby. 1 5 Likewise the Penn- one decision to this effect before the
20
sylvania statute requires only that the automobile cases were decided.
defendant "unlawfully and maliciously. Whether or not an automobile is a
inflict grievous bodily harm," and the deadly weapon is at least a jury ques(a) Aggravated Assault Based on
Infliction of Serious Injury

115 Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165

(1927).
11 The decision to this effect in Smith v. Com.,

100 Pa. 324 (1882), where a pistor was used, has
been followed in the later automobile cases.
Corn. v. Coccodralli, 74 Pa. Super. 324 (1920);
Com. v. Donnelly, 113 Pa. Super. 173, 172 AtI. 190
(1934); Com. v. Kalb, 129 Pa. Super. 241, 195 At.

428 (1938).
217 State

v. McKetterick, 14 S. C.346 (1880).

118 State v. Sussewell, 149 S. C. 128, 146 S. E.

697 (1929).

119 Supra, p. 138. It was applied to automobile
drivers in State v. Miller, 234 S. W. 813 (Mo.
Sup. 1921) and State v. Sawyers, 336 Mo. 644, 80
S. W. 2d 164 (1935). In the latter case the conviction was reversed for an error in the trial court's
instruction as to degree of negligence required.
12 COm. v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32 N. E. 862
(1893). In People v. Sullivan, 4 N. Y. Cr. 193 (5th
Dept. 1885), supra, p. 140, there was no actual
battery committed with the deadly weapon.
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tion,"1' and if it is found to be such, a
conviction is justified if there was an
intent to inflict injury, ' or extreme
recklessness,'
or the unlawful and
reckless operation of the automobile, as
24
in State v. Sudderth.'
The Sudderth case has been cited as
a conviction for "assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill" under N.
Ca. Cons. St. 1919 §4214,125 but the report of the case mentions only "assault
with a deadly weapon," and the conviction was unquestionably for this, as
§4215 provides:
"In all cases of an assault, with or
without intent to kill or injure, the person convicted shall be punished by fine
or imprisonment or both, at the discretion of the court: Provided, that where
no deadly weapon has been used and no
serious damage done, the punishment in
assaults, assaults and batteries, and affrays, shall not exceed a fine of fifty dollars or imprisonment for thirty days;
It should be noted further that there
may be a conviction of assault under
§4215 "without intent to injure," by the
express language of the statute.
Analytically, the Texas aggravated
assault statute is of this type. No circumstance of aggravation is required
by the statute except the use of a dangerous instrumentality, the statute now
punishing: 2
"Any driver or operator of a motor
121 Williamson v. State, 92 Fla. 980, 111 So. 124,
53 A. L. R. 250 (1926); State v. Stringer, 140 Ore.
452, 13 P. 2d 340 (1932).
122

State v. Stringer, supra, n. 121. No facts

are given in Williamson v. State, supra, n. 121,

from which one may judge whether the conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon with-

out intent to kill was affirmed on the basis of
recklessness or on the basis of an intentional
assault.
123 In People v. Goolsby, 284 Mich. 375, 279 N. W.
867 (1938) the defendant had been stopped by a
policeman. He told the policeman to get out of
his way and then started driving without looking

vehicle or motorcycle [who] shall wilfully or with negligence, as is defined in
the Penal Code of this State in the title
and chapter on negligent homicide, collide with or cause injury less than death
to any other person."
In a few states the statute creating
this type of aggravated assault based
primarily upon the use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon has also specifically
required "an intent to inflict bodily
harm." The ordinary interpretation of
such a statute would eliminate any
conviction based solely upon reckless27
ness, and Colorado has so held.
But Professor Tulin has pointed out
a contrary result in llinois, 128 which he
explained upon the ground that the
maximum penalty for both reckless
driving and simple assault and battery
was a fine of $100, whereas this aggravated assault carried a maximum fine
of $1,000 or imprisonment for 1 year or
both. The court, he felt, was willing to
stretch the law to convict for the aggravated assault where the penalty for
simple assault and battery was no
29
greater than that for reckless driving.1
The Illinois statute1 0 under which
the prosecution was brought punished
any:
"Assault with a deadly weapon, instrument, or other thing, with an intent
to inflict upon the person of another
bodily injury, where no considerable
to see whether or not the latter had done so.
124 184 N. C. 753, 114 S. E. 828 (1922).
1225Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1068.
126 Vernon's Texas Penal Code (1936) Art. 1149

(as amended in 1939). The punishment is a fine
of $25 to $1,000 or imprisonment from 1 month to
2 years, or both.
227 People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 169 Pac. 152
(1917).
128 People v. Benson, 321 IMI. 605, 152 N. E. 514
(1926).
129 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1068.
120 Criminal Code §25; Jones Ill. Stat (1936)
§37.039.
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provocation appears or where the circumstances of the assault show an aban-

doned and malignant heart."
Another statute provided a penalty of
imprisonment from 1 to 14 years for
"an assault with an intent to commit
murder," including an "attempt to commit murder by any means.1131 These
statutes originated together as the first
and second parts, respectively, of §52,
c. 30, of the Illinois Revised Statutes of
1845. When the automobile cases under
the first-quoted part of this section
came up for decision in the Appellate
Court of Illinois, there were earlier
cases involving reckless use of pistols
in the Supreme Court holding that the
intent to murder under the second part
of the section might be made out from
"an act committed deliberately and
likely to be attended with dangerous
consequences."'3 2 It was therefore an
a fortiori case to convict of the lesser
offence and to find an "intent to inflict

Tulin's article, one other state has
reached a similar result. The Oklahoma
statute 5 provides up to 5 years' imprisonment for"
"Every person, who, with intent to do
bodily harm, and without justifiable or
excusable cause, commits an assault
upon the person of another with any
sharp or dangerous weapon * * * al-

though without intent to kill such person or to commit any felony."
We have already seen that in 1909, in
a case of reckless shooting, the court

in the Indian Territory (which was
later organized as the state of Oklahoma) had affirmed a conviction for

an assault with intent to kill or for an
assault "with a deadly weapon with intent to inflict on the person of another
a bodily injury" under the Indian Territory statutes,36 upon proof that the
defendant would have been guilty of
murder or manslaughter if the victim
had died. 37 This same line of reasoning was carried forward in 1929 by the
injury" from the reckless use of an
Oklahoma court in Winkler v. State.3 8
33
automobile.1
In a later automobile
The commission of the misdemeanor of
case in the Supreme Court, the statute speeding was held to supply the "inwas construed as requiring a conviction
tent to do bodily harm" required by the
if the crime would have constituted present Oklahoma statute, and proof of
manslaughter from recklessness, had culpable negligence made out the as34
the victim died.1
sault. Only manslaughter cases were
cited, and the use of the words "justiSince the publication of Professor
131 Criminal Code §§23, 24; Jones Ill. Stat.
(1936) §37.037 and 37.038.

132

Perry v. People, 14 I1.496 (1853); Dunaway

v. People, 110 Ill. 333 (1884). The same test has
been used in recent non-automobile cases. Peo358, 174 N. E. 398 (1931);
ple v. Wilson, 342 Ill.
521, 12 N. E. 2d 7 (1937).
People v. Merritt, 367 Ill.
'33 People v. Clink, 216 Ill.
App. 357 (1920).
234 People v. Anderson, 310 IM. 389, 141 N. E.
727 (1923). The later decision in People v. Benson, 321 Ill. 605, 152 N. E. 514 (1926) which Professor Tulin relied upon, cited no cases, but evidently followed the Anderson case, which had
been decided three years before. The Benson
case was recently cited in Rosenberg v. Ott, 285
Ill. App. 50, 1 N. E. 2d 502 (1936).

'35 Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) §1764, now 21 Okla.
Stat. (1937) §652.
26 Indian Terr. Stat. (1899) §909.
37 Tyner v. United States, 2 Okla. Cr. 689, 103
Pac. 1057 (1909), supra, p. 144.
138 45 Okla. Cr. 322, 283 Pac. 591 (1929). At the
time of this decision the penalty for assault and
battery under Okla. Stat. (1921) §1763 was imprisonment up to 30 days or fine of $5 to $100 or
both, and the penalty for speeding under Okla.
Laws (1923) c. 16 §2 was imprisonment from 10
to 30 days or fine from $25 to $100 or both for the
first offence, and imprisonment from 30 days to
6 months or fine from $100 to $1000 or both for
the second offence.
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fiable or excusable cause" in the assault
statute, evidently referring to the statutory homicide test, 39 makes this
14
analogy not unreasonable.
Neither the Illinois nor the Oklahoma
decisions appear fully to support the
thesis that the automobile convictions
resulted from the fact that the reckless
driving and assault and battery penalties were the same. In both states prior
decisions had forecast the result before
the automobile had become a factor in
the situation. Once it was found that
there was a battery aggravated by the
use of a dangerous or deadly weapon,
an automobile, the cases arguably came
within the spirit, if not the letter, of
the statute.
(c) Assault with a Depraved Mind
4
In Wisconsin there is a statute ' iMposing a sentence of 1 to 8 years for
assaulting another:
"In a manner evincing a depraved
mind, regardless of human life, without
any premeditated design to effect the
death of the person assaulted, and under
such circumstances that if death had resulted, the assailant would have been
guilty of murder in the second degree."
The court has held that "culpable gross
negligence" is not enough for conviction under this statute, although it
would warrant a simple assault conviction. 1 2 The aggravating feature is the
extreme type of recklessness which
would have justified a murder convic139 Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) §1752, now 21 Okla.

Stat. (1937) §731.
140 In Lane v. State, ... Okla. Cr...., 84 P. 2d
807 (1938), the homicide analogy was drawn upon
in a case involving the accidental discharge of a
gun, and a conviction of the aggravated assault
was affrmed.
141 Wis. Stat. (1921) §4374a.
142 Njecick v. State, 178 Wis. 94, 189 N. W. 147
(1922).

tion at the common law, and of course
negligence sufficient only for manslaughter should not suffice. 43 But
there is no requirement of an intent to
cause injury, if injury has in fact resulted.
(d) Assault with Intent to Inflict a
Great Bodily Injury
If the only aggravating feature is this
type of intent, clearly there is no basis
for holding a defendant for recklessness, and the few automobile cases in
which a District Attorney has managed
to secure a conviction of this type, have
been reversed.1' Professor Tulin comments on an Iowa case as follows:
"This means that the court regarded
the penalty for reckless driving (maximum fine of $100 or imprisonment not
exceeding 30 days) as sufficient."'14
May it not mean that no earlier Iowa
precedents involving non-automobile
cases which would uphold a conviction
14
were called to the court's attention,
and that the court was unwilling to
depart from its concept of "intent,"
whatever the consequences may have
been?
(e) Assault with Intent to Murder
Apart from the Georgia cases, there
have been few indictments for assault
with intent to murder by the use of an
automobile which have come before appellate courts. Most of the defendants
143 See supra, p. 136.
14 State v. Richardson, 179 Iowa 770, 162 N. W.
28 (1917) People v. Smith, 217 Mich. 669, 187 N. W.
304 (1922).
145 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale I J. 1048 at 1068-69.
146 In State v. Richardson, 179 Iowa 770, 162
N. W. 28 (1917), supra, n. 144, the only Iowa authority which might in any way have justified
the conviction was State v. Myers, 19 Iowa 517
(1865), and this case was probably not cited by
counsel, for it was not mentioned in the decision.
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have been acquitted of this offense by
the jury,147 but in Shorter v. State,'"

there was a conviction which was reversed on appeal. The court treated the
case like a murder case, and the conviction, based solely on the commission
of the misdemeanor of exceeding the
speed limit, of course could not stand
without proof of an intent even to injure.
But the Georgia cases present a different story. There are three cases in
which reckless use of an automobile
has been held to be "an assault with
intent to murder by using any weapon
likely to produce death" under Penal
Code §97, carrying 2 to 10 years' imprisonment. It is a fact that the penalties in Georgia for reckless driving and
for simple assault and battery are the
same.1 49 Both are misdemeanors, and
the maximum penalty for a misdemeanor is a year with the chain gang or 6
months in jail or a fine of $1,000, or all
three. 10 But this would hardly seem
to call for any distortion of the law in
order to inflict an even more serious
penalty upon a reckless driver, no matter how much damage he has caused.
Indeed, this maximum penalty for simple assault and battery in Georgia is
greater than that for the same crime in
any other state listed in Professor Tulin's table.'
If it is the low penalty
for reckless driving and assault and
147 Williamson v. State, 92 Fla. 980, 111 So. 124,
53 A. L. R. 250 (192); State v. Sussewell, 149 S. C.
128, 146 S. E. 697 (1929); Davis v. Corn., 150 Va.
611, 143 S. E. 641 (1928). But Duhon v. State, 136
Tex. Crim. 404, 125 S. W. 2d 550 (1939), was a
conviction which was affirmed on appeal. The
state's evidence was that the defendant had intentionally run over the victim when she had
refused to accede to his immoral demands, and
from such conduct it was proper for the jury
to find the specific intent to kill required by
the statute.

battery which leads to a conviction for
an aggravated assault, one would expect Georgia to be the last state to convict of aggravated assault, not one of
the earliest, as it was in fact.
The first automobile conviction under
this Georgia statute was in 1914 in
Dennard v. State. 52 The defendant,
driving a car in good condition, unaccountably hit a pedestrian who was
walking some distance off the travelled
portion of the road. The verdict of
guilty was held warranted by the evidence, the Court of Appeals saying: 153
"The presumption of malice may arise
from a reckless disregard of human life;
and 'there are wanton or reckless states
of mind which are sometimes the
equivalent of a specific intent to kill,
and which may and should be treated
by the jury as amounting to such intention when productive of violence likely
to result* in the destruction of life,
though not so resulting in the given instance.' Gallery v. State, 92 Ga. 464, 17
S. E. 863. And see Collier v. State, 39 Ga.
31, 34."
The Gallery case, decided by the
Georgia Supreme Court in 1893, had
held there was no presumption of intent to murder from the use of a deadly
weapon, if death did not result, but had
added the words quoted above, which
were the basis of this decision twenty
years later. 4 The Collier case, decided
in 1869, had gone much further, and
was not overruled until 1929.155
148 147 Tenn. 355, 247 S. W. 985 (1923).
149 Georgia Code (1933) §26-1408 makes battery
a misdemeanor, and §§68-301, 68-307 and 68-9908
make driving at an excessive speed and driving
while intoxicated punishable as misdemeanors.
150 Georgia Penal Code §1065, Code (1933) §272506.
151 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J.1048 at 1064-65.
15214 Ga. App. 485, 81 S. E. 378 (1914).
1ss 14 Ga. App. 488.
154

Supra, p. 143.
n. 57.

155 See supra,
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There were no other Georgia decisions on this point until 1927, when
three cases were decided in the same
division of the Court of Appeals and by
the same three judges, within two
weeks of each other, which took both
sides of the question. In Chambliss v.
State'56 the court, in an opinion by
Luke, J., followed the Dennard case,
and affirmed an aggravated assault conviction based upon reckless and unlawful driving. On the same day Broyles,
J., wrote the opinion of the same court
in Andrews v. State, 157 in which the defendant had operated a car with a
smoke screen device which emitted
deadly carbon monoxide and had
caused a pursuing officer to run into
the bank of the road. The court reversed the conviction upon the ground
that there was no proof that the defendant knew of the poisonous gas he
was emitting, whereas "the specific intent to kill is a necessary ingredient
of the offense." Twelve days later
Broyles, J., wrote another opinion in
Springer v. State"1 8 in which the court
categorically held that an intentional
assault and battery was needed for
conviction of the aggravated assault,
and reversed a conviction based on
reckless driving.
Then came two cases in which it was
156 37 Ga. App. 124, 139 S. E. 80 (July 14, 1927).

37 Ga. App. 95, 138 S. E. 923 (July 14, 1927).
118 37 Ga. App. 154, 139 S. E. 159 (July 26, 1927).
119 Goldin v. State, 38 Ga. App. 110, 142 S. E.
757 (1928); Sudan v. State, 41 Ga. App. 828, 155
S. E. 102 (1930).
160 Smith v. State, 39 Ga. App. 552, 147 S. E. 781
(1929); Neese v. State, 40 Ga. App. 503, 150 S. E.
451 (1929); Gresham v. State, 46 Ga. App. 54, 166
S. E. 443 (1933).
161 Easley v. State, 49 Ga. App. 275, 175 S. E.
23 (1934).
157

clear that the defendants had intentionally run down their victims in automobiles,51 9 but no more convictions for
a reckless "assault with intent to murder" were affirmed in Georgia for seven
years. Broyles, J., carried his colleagues with him in following the
Springer case in the next three decisions. 6 ' But when the other two judges
resigned, the new majority of the court
in 1934 overruled these cases, going
back to the language of the Supreme
Court in the Gallery case in 1893, to
uphold a conviction for a reckless assault with intent to kill, leaving Broyles, J., to dissent. 6' The most recent
case is to the same effect, although a
higher degree of recklessness is required for the aggravated assault than
the criminal negligence which is all
that is needed for simple assault and
battery. 6

2

The problem is one which

should be brought to the attention of
the Supreme Court of Georgia.
The drafting of an indictment for a
Georgia aggravated assault by reckless
use of an automobile has given rise to
some problems. As we have seen, Penal
Code §97 punishes "an assault with intent to murder by using any weapon
likely to produce death." It has been
held that no words in the indictment
which do not charge an "intent to mur162 Mundy v. State, 59 Ga. App. 509, 1 S.E. 2d
605 (1939). This case is further remarkable in
that it held extreme intoxication rendering the
defendant unable to manage his car would justify
a conviction of assault with intent to murder,
contrary to the general rule that intoxication
may be a defence if it is so complete as to negative the specific intent required. People v. Gil-

day, 351111. 11, 183 N. E. 573 (1932). But of course
once the major premise of the Georgia decisions
is adopted, that no intent to murder need be
proved, the intoxication unquestionably does
provide cogent evidence of its substitute, reck-

lessness.
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der" will suffice.1 63 But the requirement of the use of a "weapon likely to
produce death" has been virtually
eliminated. Anything which a man can
use with intent to kill, will suffice for
conviction, and no allegations characterizing the means used are needed in
164
the indictment.
Conclusion
We have found most of the automobile assault and battery cases following
the historical development of battery
in this country which started in 1858
with the Sloanaker case, by which, as
in manslaughter, there may be liability for injury recklessly caused. This
development of battery was virtually
completed before the first automobile
case was decided in 1912. Nor does the
relation between the penalties for assault and battery and for reckless driving appear to have been at all material
in the automobile cases, except in guiding the prosecuting attorney's discretion in selecting the crime for which
to try the defendant.
There are a few exceptions. Liability
for assault has been imposed for reckless conduct causing injury, although
ordinarily an assault (as distinguished
from a battery) requires an intent to
injure, or at least to alarm. But these
cases involve no more than interpreting the term "assault" in a statute or
indictment to include also a battery, or
else finding in a reckless battery whates In Wright v. State, 168 Ga. 690, 148 S. E. 731
(1929), an indictment charging the infliction of
serious wounds by the operation of an automobile "with a reckless disregard for human life"
was held insufficient, and in Minge v. State, 45
Ga. App. 197, 164 S. E. 68 (1932), an allegation
that an assault was committed "with malice
aforethought" was also held insufficient. But in
Easley v. State, 49 Ga. App. 275,175 S. E. 23 (1934),

ever intent is needed for such an assault. Such interpretation is clearly
reasonable, to correct a legislative misnomer, or to support a verdict for a
lesser crime than that actually proved,
and the policy behind it is clear. Statutory provisions drafted 75 years ago
to codify the common law as it then
existed should grow with the common
law. If the definition of "assault" in the
aggravated assault statutes were intended to be limited to the assault without a touching which requires an intent
to inflict injury, statutes penalizing an
"assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do harm," as is true in Colorado,
Illinois and Oklahoma, would not have
been drafted with such a tautological
6

form of expression.1 1

There is a simple solution for this
problem which ought to be adopted in
every state---the enactment of a statute
providing:
"In any criminal case, the word 'assault' in any indictment, information,

warrant, complaint, or other pleading
shall be deemed to include and charge
also a battery. Proof that a defendant
has committed a battery shall be sufficient to sustain a conviction for assault
in any crime in which criminal liability
is predicated, in whole or in part, upon

an assault."
This suggested statute, as far as pleading is concerned, should be added to
§188 of the American Law Institute's
Code of Criminal Procedure.
The second exception is found where
a reckless battery has been held to wara conviction for the aggravated assault was affirmed where the indictment charged the infliction of injury with a reckless disregard of human
life "which reckless disregard was the equivalent
of an intent to kill and murder."
184 Wright v. State, 168 Ga. 690, 148 S. E. 731
(1929) (by a divided court), following Monday v.
State, 32 Ga. 672 (1861).
265 See supra, p. 152.
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rant a conviction for an aggravated assault and battery which, by statute,
expressly required an intent to inflict
harm or to murder. This rests upon
the cases from Illinois, Oklahoma and
Georgia, and an ambiguous intimation
in Tennessee. 6 6 In each of the first
three states the automobile cases merely follow earlier decisions involving
other means of inflicting injury. In
Georgia at least, inadequacy of the penalty for the reckless driver could not
be the reason for his liability for the
aggravated assault-18 months and
$1,000 fine would seem to be enough for
him under any rational view. Opposed
to these cases are decisions denying
liability under somewhat similar statutes in Colorado, Iowa and Texas.
The early non-automobile cases upon
which the modern Illinois, Oklahoma
and Georgia decisions rest may well
represent an attempt to find a suitable
penalty for a reckless battery aggravated by the infliction of serious injury
or the creation of a great risk through
the use of a deadly weapon, where the
only aggravated assault which the legislature had created required an intent
to harm or murder. As Professor Tulin
has asked, "The function [of penalties]
should be openly expressed. '16T But

from a review of all these cases, it appears that penalties have played a
much smaller part in the development
of modern judge-made law than Professor Tulin's article seemed to indicate.
Of course, where the meaning of a
statute is in doubt, courts should and
do consider whether the penalty sheds
any light on the probable intention of
the legislature. This is a particularly
fruitful source of light where the question at issue is whether the requirement
of a fraudulent intent is to be read into
a statute.6 8 But it would seem better
on the whole, in the case of aggravated
assault, if there had been no convictions based on reckless driving under
statutes requiring a specific intent to
injure or kill, even if the alternative
was a penalty for a simple assault
which the court felt to be inadequate.
In Texas and New York, where the
courts declined to let recklessness play
the role of intent in assault and battery,
corrective legislation was rapidly forthcoming to deal with the reckless driver
of an automobile. 16 9 With legislatures
as active as they are today, and in a
better position than most courts to
judge of the desires of their citizens,
judicial restraint seems wiser than ever.

166 Shorter v. State, 147 Tenn. 355, 247 S. W.
985 (1923).
167 Tulin, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1048 at 1069.
168 The penalty was the determining factor in
the search for what "the Legislature must have
intended" in People v. Clark, 242 N. Y. 313, 151
N. E. 631 (1926). As to the importance of the
penalty in the allied problem of mistake of fact,
see Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal
Law, (1939) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 35, 59, and Sayre,
Public Welfare Offenses, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev.
55, 83.
169 The Texas statute was passed in 1917, with
a maximum penalty of 2 years' imprisonment
and $1,000 fine, for aggravated assault by automobile. See supra, p. 141. The New York statute
was passed in 1921, making the "culpably negli-

gent" operation of a vehicle "whereby another
suffers bodily injury" into an assault in the
third degree, carrying punishment up to one
year and fine up to $500, or both. See supra, p. 141.
The legislatures of Colorado and Iowa have
not raised their maximum penalties for simple
assault and battery since the decisions referred
to. The Colorado penalty for assault and battery was already about adequate for a reckless
driver-6 months' imprisonment or $100 fine.
Courtright Stat. (1913) §1659. The Iowa legislature has permitted cumulation of assault and
reckless driving penalties in its latest statute,
which will permit a maximum sentence of 60
days' imprisonment and $200 fine for a battery
by reckless driving. Laws 1937, c. 134, §§311, 314,
315; Code (1935) §12929.

